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INTRODUCTION
The political consequences of redistricting the Tenth Legislative District. which comprises four g~og·r .aphically separated areas, is
the subject of this thesis (see map. page vii).
because of its unique characteristics.

This area was chosen

Previous to redistricting these

areas comprised not only three different counties and legislative districts, but three different congressional districts as well.
Usually legislative districts are contiguous and the examination of one part separate from the whole is not practical unless it is
a precinct analysis that is desired.

Concurrent with the change in

legislative district lines 1 many precincts assumed new dimensions and
names, as well as lines, making comparison of precinct returns impossible.
Having four separated areas al lows the examination of the voting patterns
of much larger groups than precincts, and still permits a study of this
dimension to be realized.

A more comprehensive study would, no doubt,

provide a better basis for analysis, but time and financial limitations
negated this possibility.
Each section, Whidbey Island, Camano Island, Bainbridge Island
and the Northern part of the Kitsap Peninsula, can be observed both as
a separate unit and as a member of an entire district.

Each area is

described as it existed prior to redistricting, and a short resume of
the events leading up to redistricting is reviewed.
concentrates on four major areas:
(1)

The effect of the swing vote.
vi
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(2)

The level of partisan strength• both before and
after redistricting.

(3)

The effects of the "home-town" vote.

(4)

The effect of increased power in state elections
as the segments become more influential in the
total district.'

Prior to examination of the s tati s ti cs on voting, a number of
factors need to be understood.

The data on the position of State

Senator were eliminated, since this position was not filled by the
electorate of the new Tenth District until 1968.

Up to that time,

Senator Dewey Donahue• from Southeastern Wa~hi ngton represented the
"Tidewater Tehth 11 • *
No absentee votes were included, as they are given for an entire
area and the as$ignment of the votes to a particular area was impossible.
The size of the. absentee vote was small and does not appreciably affect
the data.
the

11

The figures under the State Representative position represent

drop-off 11 effect make it impossible to determine the exact number

voting in the State Representative position.
The analysis contained in this study are based on. a three-point
program.

Statistical data were acquired through numerous public offices,

including the Auditors' offices of the three counties involved, and the
Elections Division of the Secretary of States's office.

The data taken

during the preapportionment period had to be extrapolated precinct by
precinct for each candidate, as no other breakout was available.
In light of the fact that the redistricting was essentially a
political act, it was necessary to contact political leaders of both
parties.

Senator Robert Grei ve and Representative Gary Grant were con*Coined by Charles Elicker in his campaign of 1966.
viii

sulted in relation to the philosophy held by the Democrats during the
tirre that the Redistricting Act was in the developrrental stage.

Slade

Gorton was contacted as it was he who developed the Republi.can version
of the Redi s tri cti ng Act.

Richard · Schweitzer, a merrber of the Repub l i-

can Research Staff, provided a current county-by-county analysis of the
1968 election, which is alluded to later.

Finally, the statistical

data obtained for the years 1962 through 1964 were compared with that
obtained for the years 1966 through 1968 and the changes .in voting behavior were noted.
Before attempting to draw conclusions on the basis of the statistics alone, this writer contacted the candidates involved, checked
the newspaper for relative data, and, whenever possible, correlated
these facts with information gained in background reading.

As a candi-

date for the State Legislature in the Tenth District in 1966, this
writer had personal conversations with candidates and political leaders
that have aided his understanding of this area.

ix

CHAPTER I
DESCRIPTION OF PREAPPORTIONED AREA
"President Eisenhower's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
in 1955, came to the conclusion that the more the role of the states in
our system is emphasized, the more important it is that the State Legisla_ture be. reasonably representative of the people. 11 1

In 1956 • the

League of Women Voters submitted an initiative to the voters of Washington State to help make the legislature more representative of the people.
The Initiative passed, only to have the legislature, in the spring of

1957: amend it.

The amended form of redistricting did very little in

changing the districts, as the League had proposed.
Greive indicated that this i ni ti ati ve had
the League had not considered.

11

Senator Robert

politi cal consequences" that

There were many legislators who stood to

lose their seats if the 1966 redistricting initiative had remained as
passed.
In 1962, the Supreme Court paved the way for the sweeping legis1 ative reapportionment.

In the Case of Baker vs. Carr, it was noted

that:
_The· main legal point of the Baker case was the ·ruling
that apportionment suits wereTuai ci ab le.
This meant that now the Supreme Court would consider cases of malapportioned state legislatures within its jurisdiction, and a flurry of cases
began to appear on the federal dockets.

The case in Washington was

lBaker, Gordon E., The Reapportionment Revolution, Random
House (N.Y., 1966), p. 101.

2

Thigpen vs. Meyers.

The case was instituted in the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Western District of Washington, Northern Division,
in an attempt to force the legislature to reapportion the state.
Throughout the next three years, the courts gave the legislature every
opportunity to act upon redistricting.
heard argument, but, 11 •••

In June of 1962, the court

postponed action until after the November,

1962, election. 112
In 1962, the League of Women Voters again submitted a redistricting initiative to the people.
the initiative failed.
the courts.

This time the opposition was heavy and

The question of redistricting again returned to

Arguments were heard, but the decision was delayed until

after the legislature convened in the Spring of 1963.

Both houses of

the legislature were controlrled by the Democrats, and the Governor was
a Democrat.

However, even under these conditions no agreement was

possible on redistricting.

A few Democrats in the House of Represen-

tatives joined with the Republicans in the House and blocked any redistricting bill.

The question of reapportionment then went back to

the courts and the Judge .war.ned that .if the Legislature did not pass
on reapportionment, that the court would take over and do it.
The remedies open to the judge were numerous. The
court ·could reapportforr ·the ·legi·s·la ture; •it could
appoint a master to reapportion the legislature in
its behalf, it could declare the existing districts
null and void and call for at-large legislative elections,
or it could force the legislature to act using weighted
votes, to name just a few of the alternatives. McDermott
feels that the threat of at-.large .elections .was the
most salient for the parties concerned.3
2Best, James J., "The Impact of Reapportion~nt ,on the Washington House of Representatives", James Tobinson, (ed.), Legislative Innovation, (Publisher unknown) (Forthcoming, 1971).
3Ibid., p. 11.

3

The Federal District Court ruled that the 1957 redistricting
laws were null and void and that no further elections could be held.

At

this point the state appealed the Thigpen case to the Supreme Court.

Be-

fore ruling on the Thigpen case. the Supreme Court delivered its second
landmark case. Reynolds vs. Simms, stating that:
As a basic constitutional standard the Equal Protection
Cl a use requires th at the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state llgislature must be apportioned on a
population basis.
Following this decision, the Thigpen case was , upheld by the Supreme
Court.

There was some delay in the execution of the court's decision.

but the resulting action was that the 1965 legislature was required to
deal with the issue of redistricting prior . to any other state business.
A leading party member indicated that one of the basic factors
considered in redistricting was to save as many incumbents as possible.
11

We might define the legislator's perception of his role in reapportion-

ment as that of disturbing the status quo as little as possible. 115

This

was not entirely possible. as the control of the legislature was divided
between the Democratic and Republican Parties.

With continued threat

of court intervention. a compromise was necessary if a redistricting
were to be achieved by the legislature.

Therefore. it was agreed that

Democratic Senator Robert Greive would prepare a plan that would satisfy
the Democrats in the Senate and Slade Gorton, working with Governor
Daniel Evans, would submit the Republican version which would benefit
Republicans in the House of Representatives.

Even with this type of

4Bartholomew 1 Paul c., Leadin~ Cases on the Constituion. Littlefield, Adams & Co.• lTotowa. N.J., l9 7), p. 506.
5sest, op. cit., p. 35.

arrangement• it was not easy to complete the. redi s tri cti ng, as minority

4

Democrats in the House feared the loss of their seats, and for good
reason, and voted against the House proposals recommended by Slade Gorton.
The research and analysis carried on by the Republicans paid off, for
the final passage of the Reapportionment Act stood to benefit the Republican Party to a much greater extent than the Democratic Party.

Perhaps

a lesson of this type will encourage a research staff in the Democratic
Party on a more equal par with that of the Republican Party.

An exami-

nation of the control of legislative districts before ·and ·after ·redi-stricti ng shows s i gni fi cant· increases· in· Republican strength:
TABLE l
Control* Of Legislative Districts, By Party6

Number of Districts
1964
1968
Solidly Republican
Split Control

ff

Solidly Democratic
*Solidly Democratic or Republican means that eigher party won
all seats in the district.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

15 two-member districts. and 3 single-member districts
6 two-member districts and 2 three merrber districts.
4 three-member districts, 12 two-merrber districts and
2 single-member districts.
25 two-member districts.
7 two-menber districts, and 1 three-member district.
16 two-menber districts.

6see Bruce M. Haston, "Impact of Reapportionment on Election of
1967 Legislature," Quorum, Vol. 1, Fall, 1966, pp. 1-2.
The general philosophy adopted, then by both parties was to

5

protect incunbents, and increase individual party strength within the
House of Senate.
The writer was told by one party that when it came to putting
together three island and one peninsula to fonn a new distric·t , they
really didn't know what to do with Island County, as it did not seem to
have any commonality with any other area, but it was generally agreed
by both Democrats and Republicans that "water and Republicans go toAs was stated by one party:

gether".

Generally waterfront, view, and prestige property is owned
by people of the higher income bracket and they tend to
vote Republican. Also, in this new area a good nunber of
retired people are to be found and they have jhe same
propensity to vote for Republican candidates.
Richard Schweitzer confided that in the drawfog of the lines for the
L

new Tenth District. the Republicans were confident of gaining control.
It appears as though he did his homework well.

The next chapter deals

with a description of the new district, concentrating on three criteria.
A description of the old districts will be presented.

An examination

will be made as to the role each portion played in its own district.
General voting characteristics will be examined for each area as they
previously existed, as well as the voting habits of the entire previous
district.

?statement by Senator Robert Grei ve, telephone conversation,
March , 19 70 •

CHAPTER II
DESCRIPTION OF APPORTIONED AREA
Before analyzing the effects of redistricting, an examination of
the Tenth District as it appeared before 1965 is necessary.

This will

permit analysis of the effect, if any, that the majority part of a
district has on the minority part, especially if the minority part is
geographically separated from the remainder of the district.

The writer

will attempt to observe whether, as each segment has a larger voice in
the total district elections, the interest of the people of the district
in the elections is increased.
In the two elections prior to redistricting, Whidbey Island was
part of the 38th Legislative District, which also comprised the City of
Everett and the suburban precincts surrounding it.

Of the total district,

Whidbey Island represented only 9% of the total votes in the elections
of 1962 and 1964.

Chart No. 1, on page 8, shows the votfog statistics

for the 38th Legislative District as it appeared in 1962 and 1964.

For

Congressional and Gubernatorial candidates, the Republicans received an
oveNhelming majority on Whidbey Island, whereas the remainder of the
district proved less Republican.

In the position of State Representative,

Whi dbey voters gave a majority of votes to the Repub 1i can candidates,
although not the same ljlajority as in the other races cited.

It should

be noted that in this race, two of the three State Representatives were
Democrats, and one of those Democrats came from Mukilteo and maintained
high rapport among the voters of the Island, which may have accounted
6
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CHART NO. l
WHIDBEY ISLAND AND SNOHOMISH COUNTY
VOTING RETURNS

tong-

[hst
~em··

~e

4325
9%

2646
66%

1361
34%

6007
53%

5290
47%

Snohomish Precinct 41941
91%
Percent of Total

21778
56%

16800
44%

52624
48%

57309
52%

3254
56%

2559
44%

8453
51%

8241
49%

1962
Whi dbey Precincts
Percent of Total

Votes
Cast

Governor
Ree. Dem

~ee

~tate

!tee.
Dem.

1964
Whidbey Precincts
Percent of Total

6067
9%

3790
64%

Snohomish Precinct 59339 31036
Percent of Total
91%
53%

2170
36%
27044
47%

24352
43%

32490
57%

68317
43%

89732
57%
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for the reasonably good Democratic showing.
In the next chapter the issue of swing vote will be discussed for
each are_a, which may help to explain a nunber of the following occurrences:
In the Congressional race for the North Kitsap Area and Whidbey Island,
Democrats netted substantial gains in 1966 and 1968 over the 1962 and
1964 period.

Also, Republicans gained considerably in the State Repre-

sentative race on Whidbey Island and Bainbridge Island during the same
period.

After redistricting in 1965, the 38th District was a "solid"

Democratic District.

To be "solid" a district must elect all of its

representatives from one party.

This was made possible because the

Republican Whidbey area and the area that now comprises the 21st District, which is Republican, were taken from the 38th District.

This

created two Republican districts, the 10th and the 21st; and one Democratic district, the 38th.

This two for one cont>ination is what gave the

Republicans increased power in the House of Representatives.
Camano.Island, a very Republican area (see Chart No. 2, page 10)
is examined in the next secion.
the 39th District.

Tenth District, Camano was a part of

Camano Island, in 1962 and 1964, represented 4% of

the total district votes cast.

The statistics on Chart No. 2, page 10,

indicate that regardless of the effect of incuirbents, on the average
Camano Island remained better than 55% Republican.

The remainder of

the 39th District was essentially Democratic, and following the redistricting, the 39th District could be classified as "solid" Democratic,
as the entire state delegation bore the Democratic label.
From the 23rd District two segments were taken -· Bainbridge
Isl and and North Ki ts ap County.

In Ki ts ap County the division was

made along the Eastern Shore of Dyes In 1et, up to Si 1verda le. and then

10

CHART NO. 2
CAMANO ISLAND AND REMAINDER OF
39tH DISTRICT VOTING RETURNS

1962
Camano Preci nets
Percent of Total

Votes
Ca~t

Governor
Dem. Ree.

820
4%

39th District Precincts 17642
96%
Percent of Total

~ong.
Ree.

01st.
Dem ..

State
Ree.

R:e12 I
Dem.

426
57%

328
43%

783
52%

710
48%

8925
56%

7135
44%

12569
41%

18346
59%

478
49%

495
51%

936
51%

930
49%

13556
61%

18004
42%

24644
58%

1964
Camano Preci nets
Percent of Total

1007
4%

583
59%

405
41%

39th District .Pre-eincts 23096 11121 11409 8686
Percent of Total
95%
49%
51% 39%
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North to Hood Canal.

Prior to redistricting, the North Kitsap Area

(not including Bainbridge Island which will be treated separately} represented about 31% of the total votes in the district.

North Kitsap

can be characterized by a large swing vote, as seen by the statistics
on Chart No. 3, page 12.
In 1962, North Kitsap gave 52% of her vote to the Democratic
candidates for State Repre-sentative, whic;h. inc;l.uded two Democratic incumbents, while giving 72% of the vote to the Republican Congressional
incumbent.

When voting the "ins" out became popular in 1964,_ this same

Republican incurrt>ent received only 50% of the North Kitsap vote, which
may not indicate the strength of the Republican power, but the size of
the swing vote.

North Ki ts ap _then• appears to be neither strongly

Democratic or Republican, but controlled by a fairly large swing vote,
which will be discussed later.

As for the post-apportioned 23rd District,

Democrats have remained in solid co.ntrol.
The last area to be analyzed in Bainbridge Island which was a
part of the 23rd Legislative District in Kitsap County and merrber of
the First Congressional District from the Seattle Area.

Bainbridge

Island, in spite of ferry service to Seattle and a bridge 'to Kitsap
County, is isolated.

Bainbridge Island is an area of homes of Seattle

commuters and retired people, and traffic through the island to the
peninsula is minimal.

Bainbridge- Island· is becoming an area of higher

income homes, therefore, one would expect increasing Republican strength.
As part of the 23rd District, Bainbridge Island represented only 8% of

the total votes cast.

Throughout the period both bef9re and after re-

dis tri cti ng • Bainbridge Is 1 and was. a Re pub 1i can s trongho 1d.

Some Repµb-

1i can candidqtes felt so confident that they never campaigned on the
island and were still able to draw a majority of votes.

In 1962, when

12

CHART NO. 3
NORTH KITSAP COUNTY VOTING RETURNS

1962

Votes
Cast

Govetnor
Ree. Oem.

Cong.
~ee.

01s t.
Oem.

North Kitsap Precincts
Percent of Total

9239
31%

6190
72%

2352
38%

Bainbridge Preci nets
Percent of Total

2542
8%

2001
80%

488
20%

North Kitsap Prec_incts 11 ,645 5853 5720
Percent of Total
51%
33%
49%

5420
50%

5452
50%

Bainbridge Precincts
Percent of Total

2292
71%

496
29%

State
Ree.

~ee.
5em.

12 ,418 13,648
48%
52%
4298
65%

2287
35%

1964

3109
9%

1935
63%

1136
37%

13,907 17,816
44%
56%
4841
58%

3477
42%

13

the Democrats had two of the three State Representative positions,
Bainbridge Island gave 65% of the- v~te to the Republican candidates.

In

1964, a year in which it has been noted many times that the Republicans
suffered a loss of votes, Bainbridge Island remained 68% Republican in
the State Representative race. Some gain was ·made ·by the Democrats. as
can be seen by Chart No. 3, page 12, but the area is definitely characterized by a strong_Republica_n ba_se and .a small swing vote.
In the following chapter each of the four geographical areas
will be examined as they now appear.

Their partisan voting habits, the

variety of influences such as the size and direction of the swing vote
and the effect of the total vote on each segment will be the basis of
analysis.

CHAPTER I II
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
REAPPORTIONMENT
Even a cursory glance at the statistics of the new Tenth District indicates a strong Republican district.

But, what changes actually

occurred in the different areas following redistricting?
political effects of redistricting?

What were the

A political description is pre-

sented which will make a picture of the whole district easier to understand.
Using the four elections of the 1960s, a swing vote was computed
to help explore the political diversity of each area.
not an accurate figure, and has a number of weaknesses.

The swing vote is
For example:

A particular candidate may be bolted by a significant
_ nulTber of his own part;t regulars who themselves woulfi
nonnal ly be considered to be straight patty voters.

An example of th-i s occurred in Bainbridge Island in 1966 and will be
discussed later.

In calculating the swing vote, the modified pattern

was followed on a district level that Richard Schweitzer. Jr., author
of The 1968 Election in the State .of Washington, used on the county level.
Using the four general elections of 1962 1 1964, 1966, and 1968,
the lowest percentage of votes that any Republican candidate received
was found to be the "hardcore" Republican vote.

The saire procedures

were used in de1;enninging · the "hardcore" Democr.atic vote _and the remainder
8schweitzer, Richard H., Jr., The 1968 Election in the State of
Washington, Republican State Central Committee (Olympia, Wash., l969)
p. 5.
14

of the 100% was the swing vote.

15
The Democratic and Republican candidates

were examined to determine the "hardcore" vote for each area.

It was

important, therefore, to note whether any candidate's percentage of
vote fell substantially below that reported by any other candidate of
the same party.

Many ti mes a very weak, ineffective candidate may lose

"hardcore" votes of his own party and thus di start the true size of the
swing vote.

This may have been true in the case of the swing vote on

Bainbridge Island (see Bainbridge Island Congressional Election, 1966,
Chart No. 3).

The 13% Democratic vote recorded by Alice Franklin Bryant

in 1966, it is believed, represents a loss of soire normally "hardcore"
Democratic votes, and for this reason an explanation of these factors
is included in the analysis of the swing vote on Bainbridge Island.

This

area will be discussed in depth later.
The stability of the swing vote, which by the way is not discussed in the analysis by Richard Schweitzer, is another factor to be
noted.

It is believed by this writer that the swing vote calculated on

the basis of one election is more variable than the one based on four
elections.

The longer the period of time under study, the more likli-

hood that the individual extremes are avoided.

Our system of voting in,

the primary elections encourages switching, although the "position"
system adopted in conjunction with the 1965 Reapportionment Act will
force voters to vote for .! Democratic can di date or .! Repub 1i can candidate rather than the best of two candidates out of four or three out of
six, as was the case in the State Representative position prior to redistricting.

However, as issues, and candidates change and as population

shifts and changes, the intensity of the swing vote will change.

For.

example, in 1964, there was an intense anti-Goldwater feeling through-

16
out the United States, not comparable to any election since the early
1930s.

The anti-Goldr'Jater feeling developed into a definite anti-Repub-

li can fee 1i ng which affected many state can di dates th rough out the
United States.

Therefore. considering these factors. the "swing" per-

centages contained herein are not intended to be accurate over a period
of years without proper verification.
Whidbey Island has increased its influence ·in · the total · district.
Once only 9%. it now casts about 27% ·of ·the · total ·district vote.

The

swing vote for Whidbey demonstrates · the large ·positive ·strength·of the
Republicans. but ·does ·not ·close ·the · door · to·the ·possibility ·of ·Democratic victory. as can be noted ·by the ·saccess ·of ·Congressman Meeds in
1966 and .1968.

wRIDBEY IstANb SwiNG voTE i§Gz-1968
Republican Party ••

...

.44%

Democra ti c Party • • • • • • • • 30%
Swing Vote • • • • • • • •

.26%

These percentages compare very closely with what Richard Schweitzer had
computed in his analysis of the political profile of Washington State.
although his computations include all of Island County and these figures
reflect Whidbey Island only. which constitutes 85% of the voting power
of the district.
In the second area. Camano Island increased its total influence
in the district from 4% to 6%.

Even though this is a 50% increase.

Camano still remains but a minuscule part of the entire Tenth District.
The voting returns following redistricting still indicate that Camano

17

Island is a 11 safe 11 Republican area, that is, Republicans can count on a
majority of votes for any candidate tha~ ~~e~.~ominate.

The swing vote

looks grim for any would-be Democratic can di date:
CAMANo·rstAND SWING VOTE 1962-1968
Republican Party • • • • • • • 47%
Democratic Party •
• 37%
Swing Vote
•• 16%
.

.. . .. ...

For a Democratic can di date to carry th·i s area, and few• ever have, he
must carry all the Democratic votes and ·essentially all the swing votes
to win.
Camano Island has one factor of conmonality with Whidbey Island,
i.e., they are both members of Island County, and local candidates of
one area readily become known to all voters.
The largest of the three areas, Kitsap County, now comprises 50%
of the total district vote, compared to 30% prior to redistricting.

See

the below for the level of partisan vote within the North Kitsap area.
Although prior to redistricting Kits·ap County favored Democ'rati'c candidates, th~ northern half did not have the_ same Democratic strength as
that of the southern part.

Examination of the precincts for a six year

period, 1962 to 1968, included four general elections and shows the
northern part of· Kitsap County demonstrates the level of the swing vote.
Note the swing vote percentages below:
NORTH KiTSAP co-DFJTV SCJfNG vott l962- l968
Republican Party • • • • • •
• • 38%
Democratic Party •
• •••• 38%
24%
Swing Vote • • • • • • •
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A characteristic of any district with a sizeable swing vote is
that the voters tend to support incumbents• as incunbents have better
naire familiarity, better organization, better financing and just plain
experience that first-time candidates do not have.

Switchers are those

who can be swayed to change their general partisan voting habits by an
effective campaign or a particularly exciting candidate.

According to

Angus Campbel 1, nearly 75% of all voters adopt the party of their
parents• some to a more rigid degree than others.

Parents who have

little interest in politics generally breed the most political apathetic
children.

These apathetic voters are generally split •fifty-fifty be-

tween the Republican and Democratic Parties.

It is from this group, as

well as from the 75% group that the switchers come.
Bainbridge Island comprises 15% of the present district, an
increase of 7% over its potential strength in the 23rd District, and
supports also a large swing vote, wh.ich, incidentally, is more Republican than Democratic.

Bainbridge Island has an extremely strong Republi-

can tendancy in all positions.

Of the positions examined, no Republican

candidate received less than 58% of the total vote.

Using the same

formula as previously, Bainbridge Island seemingly has a very small
Democratic vote:

sXINBRiDGE fsLANO swfNG VOTE 1962-1968
Republican Party • • •

• •• 58"/4

Democratic Party •

. . . . •• 13%

Swing Vote • • • •

• 29%

In this area it is believed that the swing vote as noted may
include some voters generally considered "hardcore".

Alice Franklin
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Bryant received 13% of the total Democratic Congressional vote in 1966.
On this basis one might conclude that only 13% of those voting were
"hardcore" Democrats• but after some examination, a more accurate figure
would be 20% Democratic and 22% swing.
when Alice Franklin Bryant

This is said because in 1966,

ran for Congress, she chose to oppose a

Republican candidate who, for many years. has represented Republicans in
the First· Congressional District.

In conversation with Congressman

Pelly's .aide, he indicated that the Congressman had not even visited
Bainbridge Island during the election an~ that he 'felt that his opponent
offered very little competition.

The factors that might have given Tom

Pelly this overwhelming victory on Bainbridge Island are the prestige
and name association that goes with an incurrbent, the party organization,
necessary to operate a successful campaign, and avail ab le financial
support.

The financial expenditures in the primary election of Congressman Pelly were over twice the amount that Alice Franklin Bryant spent. 9

The success of Alice Franklin Bryant can only be judged by her ability
to draw votes, and in this respect she did very poorly.
In summary, the two small island, Camano and Bainbridge, appear
to be strongly Republican with small swing voter percentages.

Whidbey

Island and North Kitsap appear to have large swing voter percentages.
In the next chapter, extreme changes in voting percentages for the preapportioned period, vis-a-vis, the post-1965 period will be examined.
The State Representative position in Whidbey and Bainbridge Island will
be examined to discuss the apparent change in voting behavior following
redistricting.
Lastly, we will compare the general voting trends of all of the
9secretary of State, Elections Division, Olympia, Washington.

I

areas to their, voting trends prior to redistricting and atte.mpt to
speculate as to the possible causes that brought about this change.

In

the final chapter, some ti me wi 11 be given to the possible future outlook for Democrats and Republicans in the new Tenth District.
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CHART NO. 4
10TH

LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
VOTING

RETURNS

. o, st.

State

Ree.

Dem.

Ree.

~ep.
Dem.

4571
23%

1772
44%

2294
56%

5942
70%

2557
30%

832
5%

374
47%

430
53%

970
63%

559
37%

N. Kitsap Precincts 9842
55%
Percent of Total

3643
38%

5999
62%

8100
45%

10039
55%

Bainbridge Preci nets 2726
15%
Percent -of Total

2440
87%

313
13%

3795
72%

1461
28%

1966

Hhi dbey Preci nets
Percent of Total
Camano Precincts
Percent of Total

votes
Cast

Governor
Ree. Clem.

· Con2~
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CHART NO. 5
10TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
VOTING RETURNS

1968

Votes
Cast

Whi dbey Precincts 6996
29%
Percent of Total
Camano Precincts
Percent of Total

1042
4%

· ~ovemor · · Con2.
□em. Ree.
Ree.

o,

st.
Dem.

~tate
Ree.

~ee.
Dem.

4196
62%

2559

38%

2972
46%

3517
54%

9335
71%

3879
29%

571
57%

435
43%

474
49%

493
51%

1196
62%

722
38%

6916
60%

11479
51%

10923
49%

981
26%

4017
59%

2752
41%

N. Kitsap Precincts 12304 6027 5903
52% 51%
Percent of Total
49%

4530
40%

Bainbridge Preci nets 3608 2377 1130 2733
Percent of Total
15% 68%
32% 74%

CHAPTER IV
SPECULATtON ON CAUSES OF
CHANGES CREATED BY REAPPORTIONMENT
It is evident that the Republicans set out to capture the Tenth
District, as they spent six times more to promote their candidates in
the primary than did the Democrats.

The figures from the Secretary of
State's office indicate this type of financial breakdown: 10
Pat Wanamaker. Republican • • • • • $2,353.70
Charles Elicker, Republican •••• 4,480.06
Arnold Wang, Republican • • • •
1,713.48
Pat Nicholson, Democrat • • • • • •
902. 36
Robert Snelson, Democrat • • • • • •
432.00
191.00
Harvey Rude, Democrat • • • • • • •
In the State Representative race, Whidbey Island, a crucial area, showed
an increase in its Republican support by 17% in 1966.
tributing to this were:

Some factors con-

Whidbey Island was essentially Republican,

even before redistricting, and the redistricting created a situation
where voters of Whi dbey Isl and could return to more nonnal voting patterns.

In addition to the basic Republican trend, and the better finan-

cial situation, the Republicans chose one candidate with name association and some political experience.

Pat Wanamaker, the Republican

candidate from Whidbey Island, had two years ~arlier run for County
Commissioner, and his Aunt, Pearl Wanamaker, former head of the State
Department of Education, also resided on Whidbey Island.

That is not

to say that Pat Wanamaker won because he lived on Hhidbey Island, but
l~secretary of State, Elections Division, Olympia Washington,
1966.
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11

he proved that 'home town ties•• in this instance Island County, are

valuable to aspiring office seekers, regardless of party,labels. 1111
11

In 1968, these
Republicans declared,

11

home town ties:

were exploited further when the

Don 1 t cancel Pat Wanamaker's vote, double it by

electing Joe Mentor, triple it by electing Charlie Elicker, 1112 ; and,
as a slogan for Pat Wanamaker. "Let's keep Island County's voice in
State Government. 1113
Redistricting made it possible for areas such as Whidbey and
Camano Island, which comprise Island County, for the first time to be
directly represented in state government.

It gave to the people of

Island County, and Bainbridge Island, the opportunity to be heard in
Olympia, hence more interest could be created in the Republican Party
locally as they provided this "new voice" in Olympia.
Another position that changed considerably concurrent with the
redistricting was the s.tate representative race on Bainbridge Island.
The statistics on Chart No. 3, indicate the Republican gain.

The rea-

sons for this change I believe can be attributed to the same factors as
caused the change in the State Representative race on Whidbey Island.
Charlie Elicker, from Bainbridge Island, ran for ·the State Representative Position Nunber Two.

His Democratic opponent, Harvey Rude, had

little financial support and was new to politics.

p. 1.
p. 14.

Although Elicker's

11whidbey News Times, The, (Volume 75 • No. 1} Sept. 22, 1966,
12whidbey News Times, The, (Volume 77 • No. 7} Oct. 31, 1968,
13 Ibid., p. 22.
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name was not as well known as Wanamaker's, he was eloquent, personable,
and had a distinct resemblance to Teddy Roosevelt.

This res~mblance

was further encouraged, as Charles Elicker wore metal-rimmed glasse~ and
sported the same type mustache as was worn by Teddy Roosevelt.

In

addition, Teddy Roosevelt's picture appeared in the background on
Elicker' s propaganda material.

Th'erefore • the fact that Bainbridge Isl and

went Republican should not surprise anyone, and the increase in Republican support is understandable under the circumstances.

In addition to

strong local party support and well qualified candidates, national factors could also have· contributed to increased Republican strength.
On the national scene, Republicans in 1966 and 1968 were regaining support lost after the Goldwater Fiasco, even to the point of
electing Richard Nixon, a two-time loser, to the White House.

In the

post-redistricting period, people in general were concerned with crime,
violence, inflation and the Viet Nam War.

Although they may not have

been convinced that Republicans had the answers, many may have thought
it was time to give them a chance.
In summary, three Republican areas, Whidbey Island, Camano
Island and Bainbridge Island were corrbined with a fairly large swing
area, North Kitsap County, to form one new district.

People take more

interest in voting when the elections directly affect them, or when they
feel that their vote counts.

Redistricting meant for these areas a

greater voice in elections, a greater share in democracy.

CHAPTER V
FUTURE OUTLOOK

The incidents that brought about the 1965 Reapportionment Act
were years in the making.

Citizen involvement, court action and finally

legislative change occurred in a process of give. and take over a period
of years before what we now have, in 1965, was born.

Si nee the Supreme

Court actions of Baker vs. Carr and Reynolds vs. Simms, states were put
on notice that the courts would no longer tolerate the type of mal apportioned legislatures that existed in many of the states prior to 1965.

It

would appear then that with the present court decisions available, the
legislature will no longer require the inducements to redistricting that
were required

earlier.

In fact, in conversation with Senator Robert

Greive, he indicated that the Democrats were now planning for what necessary

reapportionment would be required as a result of the dicennial

census currently being taken.
One interesting result of the events that brought about the
past redi stri cti ng was a greater interest on the part of party officials
in voting analysis.

At the outset of this study an attempt was made to

gather as much data as possible relating to political motivations for
redi s tri cti ng.

Inquiries were made as to what type of studies had been

carried on by both political parties prior to the drawing of legislative
lines, and found that the Republicans had a program of research going
on, on a more or less continuous basis, whereas the Democratic Party
had neglected research.

Dr. Hugh Bone, of the Political Science Depart-
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ment of the University of Washington, indicated that he too was surprised
at the lack of research facilities and personnel in the Democratic
Party, even at ~e national level.

Democratic Senator Robert Greive

indicated that the Democratic Party would like to begin the same type
of survey, but at the moment lacked the personnel.

Richard Schweitzer,

a menter of the Republican Research Staff, provided me with a copy of an
analysis of the 1968 election on a county basis, and indicated that an
analysis of the party strength was being done on a precinct by precinct
basis with the use of computers.
Perhaps now the Democrats will begin building a research staff,
and when the next opportunity for redistricting presents itself, they
will not find themselves on the short end of the redistricting stick.
This is not to infer that the Republican Research Staff alone was responsible for the vast change in legislative district control, as was noted
on page 4, for the Republicans put forth many good candidates, gave
financial support adequate to the cause, in addition to having a national
Republican trend following 1964.
But. what then of the new Tenth District? The Office of Program
Plann~ng and Fiscal Management at Olympia indicated the followi.ng
changes in population:

1960

1967

1968

1969
24,700

Island County

19,638

23,542

24,044

Kitsap County

84,176

96,683

96,357 102,800

Mr. David Weig of the Office of Program Planning and Fiscal
Management, indicated that Island County was one of the fastest growing
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areas in terms of percentage of population growth, but this was only a
small numerical increase since the total population was small.

Over the

past nine years, Island County has e?<,perienced a 25% increase and Kitsap
County has experienced a 22% increase.

It would appear that the compara-

tive voting power of Island County in relation to the KHsap County portion will not substantially change in the next two or three years.
eral employment is being reduced in the Ki ts ap County Area.

Fed-

A reduction

in The Boeing Company employees near Everett may have a tendency to slow
population growth in both areas.

Als-o, there appears to be a national

trend toward cutting military installations to save money, which could
further reduce the size of the military post at Oak Harbor in Island
County.

In respect to the element of population, no more .than a moderate

change will occur in the basic Tenth District, unless changes relative
to defense and the aircraft industry experience a rapid turnabout.
I

The Tenth District, it is believed by the writer, will remain
Republican for some time to come unless or until:
(1)

The North Kitsap area takes on a De~ocratic provincial out-

look, which at the moment looks unlikely, to offset the highly Republican vote of the remainder of the district.
(2)

A popular Democratic can di date from Isl and County consents

to run, in which case he could dominate both the North Kitsap Area and
the Whidbey . Island Area in an easy victory, but no Democrat is going to
find a victory easy in the present Tenth District, for all incumbents in
the State Legislature are now Republican.
(3)

Lastly. if an anti-Republican trend occurs at a time when

the Republican incumbents tend to be ineffective, good Democratic candi dates stand a chance of winning.
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In.addition to this, both parties generally reserve their financial support for areas that seem roost promising, and in this respect
Democrats will continue to find financing of campaigns difficult in the
Tenth District, while Republicans will be well supported.

The best sug-

gestion for candidates in the Democratic Party who aspire to the state
legislature is, (1) don't run unless you are from Island County. and;
(2) run during a presidential electi~n. as this is the time for greatest
Democratic support.
As for Republicans, maintain control of.the Island County Area
and victory wi 11 be yours.
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